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The Effects of Derecognition and
Government Succession upon Locus
Standi and Property Rights:
The Kokario Case
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Japan now has before it an unusually interesting case involving constitutional and international law which may adversely affect relations between the governments of Japan and the
People's Republic of China (PRC). The Kokario case1 is the attempt by
the Taiwanese government (Taiwan or ROC) to evict mainland Chinese
* Member of New York and Supreme Court Bars; J.D., 1935, St. John's University Law
School; B.S.S., 1935, College of the City of New York. The author acknowledges the assist-

ance of Heinz Klug and Clark Brown in research for this article.
1. Republic of China v. U Heikan (Case For Evacuation of Land and Building), Case
No. 1967 (WA) 1025 (Kyoto Dist. Ct., 4th Civ. Dep't Sept. 16, 1977) (translation on file at
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.) [hereinafter First Decision]. The translation is not entirely
satisfactory which may be due either to the translation or to the style of Japanese judicial
opinions. However, its essence is clear.
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students from a dormitory in Japan which was bought with the proceeds
of looted property taken from mainland China during World War II.
The case has been pending in the Japanese courts for over twenty years
and because of its political implications it is unlikely the Supreme Court
of Japan will decide it in the near future.
The case is important at a general level because it involves two longestablished and important subjects of international law: the legal consequences of government recognition and the determination of property
rights following governmental succession. These subjects have long concerned English and United States courts and have led to numerous scholarly writings and judicial decisions particularly in these court systems.2
American lawyers have a special interest because of the executive
branch's active role in judicial proceedings involving foreign
governments.3
There is considerable doubt as to Taiwan's capacity to sue in the
Japanese courts to retain property belonging to the Chinese state because
it is not a government recognized by Japan and, more importantly, the
ROC is not the government of the Chinese state which owns the property. While those factors should resolve that issue against the ROC, locus standi may be a matter of domestic Japanese law for which there
appears to be no precedent.
On the second issue, the determination of title to property, it seems
clear that the PRC owns the dormitory. The dormitory is the property
of the Chinese state, which is now represented by the PRC government
recognized by Japan as well as the United Nations and most of the nations of the world.
This conclusion is further supported by the public nature of the dormitory and by the circumstances of its purchase. The Japanese government apparently required the mainland Chinese students to live in that
dormitory. Education in both China and Japan served a public or governmental objective as it does now. The dormitory was purchased by the
ROC's delegation, at the request of the students, with funds from the sale
of property seized from the mainland Chinese by Japan during the SinoJapanese War.
In developing these issues, this Article discusses: (1) the historical
and political background of Japaneie relations with China; (2) the locus
2. As Professor Ian Brownlie has so well put it: "As an area of interest, recognition is
wearingly familiar." Brownlie, Recognition in Theory and Practice, 1982 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.

197.
3.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 204 comment a, reporters' notes 1 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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standi of an unrecognized government to sue in foreign courts; and (3)
the broader question of the property rights of a successor government.
This Article also briefly addresses the related issues of: (1) the differences, if any, between public domain and private domain in connection
with government succession; (2) how one determines what is sovereign
property; and (3) the differences between state and government
succession.
II.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

In the Cairo Declaration of 1943,1 President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and President Chiang Kai-Shek agreed that Taiwan
would be returned to China. This was followed by the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 to the same effect. 5 The plan was implemented by Japan's
surrender in September 1945 accepting these declarations6 and by the
ROC's occupancy of Taiwan in September 1945.'
The Chinese Revolution in 1949 resulted in Chiang Kai-Shek's departure from mainland China. Later that year, Great Britain recognized
the government of the PRC as the government of China.' Neither the
PRC nor the ROC was invited to the San Francisco Peace Treaty of
September 1951 because of the rival claims to the representation of
China. 9 The Allies (other than China) entered into the Peace Treaty
with Japan.' 0 In 1952 the ROC entered into a separate treaty with Japan
under which the ROC was recognized as the government of China."
In 1971 the PRC replaced the ROC as the representative of China to
the United Nations, taking over the China seat in the Security Council.
The ROC was ousted from the United Nations and does not remain in
any capacity. 12 Several years later, Japan and the United States recognized the PRC. On September 29, 1972, Japan and the PRC issued the
4. Press Communique of Dec. 1, 1943, 1943 FOREIGN REL. (China) 176; 9 DEP'T ST.

BULL. 393 (1943).
5. Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 2 FOREIGN REL. 1474 (1945).
6. Instrument of Surrender, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1734, 139 U.N.T.S. 387; 13 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 364-65 (1945).
7. M. WHITEMAN, 3 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 565 (1964).
8.

R.F. BOARDMAN, BRITAIN AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1974, at

13-14, 36 (1976).
9. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 7, at 541-42.
10. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136

U.N.T.S. 46.
11. Treaty of Peace, Apr. 28, 1952, China-Japan, 138 U.N.T.S. 3.
12. 1971 U.N.Y.B. 126, U.N. Sales No. E.73.I.1.
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following

six relevant

1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on
which this Joint Communique is issued.
2. The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.
3. The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that
Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic
of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects
this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it
firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam
Proclamation.
4. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's
Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as
from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take
all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of
the functions of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in
accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.
5. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that
in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese
peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.
6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's
Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and
friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other's internal
affairs, equality
3
and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.
On December 15, 1978, the United States announced that it was formalizing its relations with the PRC. This became effective on January 1,

1979.14 As a result, the Sino-United States Mutual Defense Treaty of
13. Joint Communique of Japan and the People's Republic of China, Sept. 29, 1972, 17
L. 81-82 (1973) [hereinafter Communique]; see also Kuriyama, Some
Legal Aspects of The Japan-ChinaJoint Communique, 17 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 42 (1973)
JAPANESE ANN. INT'L

(Kuriyama was Head, Treaties Division, Treaties Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan);
Iriye, The Joint Communique of Japan and the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan
Issue, 17 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 52 (1973); Takano, The Japan-ChinaJoint Communique

and the Termination of State of War, 17 JAPANESE

ANN. INT'L

L. 62

(1973).

14. Joint Communique, Dec. 15: Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, January 1,
1979, 18 I.L.M. 274.
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December 2, 1954,'5 in which the United States had pledged to defend
Taiwan, lapsed on January 1, 1980. The United States also enacted the
Taiwan Relations Act of April 10, 1979, declaring the President had terminated the governmental relations between the United States and the
governing authorities of Taiwan, establishing relations of a nongovernmental character between the "people of the United States and the people
of Taiwan," and extending to Taiwan agencies many of the benefits that
normally accrue to governments such as visa powers and the benefits of
economic and arms transfer legislation and immunities of various
16
kinds.
III.

THE KOKARIO CASE

A. History of the Kokario Case
On its face, the Kokario case is a simple eviction action brought by a
property owner. In 1967, the Taiwanese Government, 7 in the name of
the Republic of China, instituted a lawsuit against the residents in
Kokario, a student dormitory in Kyoto, Japan. During World War II,
the Japanese government apparently had insisted that all Chinese students in Kyoto move into the Kokario dormitory. 8 Kyoto University
paid the rent.
When the war ended, Kyoto University was unable to pay the rent
and the owner of Kokario, an apartment leasing company, put the building up for sale. The Allies, in control of Japan and acting through General MacArthur, established a policy of returning to the invaded
countries the loot seized by the Japanese during the war and currently in
the Allies possession.' 9 On October 18, 1946, General MacArthur requested the eleven members of the Far Eastern Commission to appoint a
reparation and restitution delegation to be stationed in Tokyo. z0 The
delegation appointed by the ROC came to Tokyo for that purpose. In
1947 Chinese students discovered looted property taken from mainland
15. Sino-United States Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, United States-China, 6
U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 248 U.N.T.S. 213 (1954).
16. 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (1979); see also Exec. Order No. 12,143, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,191 (1979);
1979 OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142-72.

17. No inferences are to be drawn from these terms or from references to the Peoples
Republic of China as PRC or Beijing.
18. Press Conference with Chu Gi Wu Regarding Guang Lui Liao, People's Daily, Mar.
16, 1987, at 7, col. I (left to right) [hereinafter Press Conference].
19. E.M. MARTIN, ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 32, 34 (1948).
20. PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE, SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,
GHQ, Two YEARS OF OCCUPATION 7 (1947).
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China which included wool, tung oil, and opium. On discovering these
goods, the students called upon the Allied headquarters in Japan "to dispose of such goods and to appropriate proceeds thereof as funds for relief
of such students covering food, clothing and housing."'" In 1950 with
the permission of General MacArthur, the ROC delegation used part of
the proceeds from the sale of the loot to buy the dormitory.22 In 1961
after a lawsuit, Kokario was officially registered in the name of the Republic of China.2 3 When the students objected to the administration of
the dormitory by the Embassy of the ROC,2 4 the ROC, represented by
the ROC's Ambassador to Japan, instituted the eviction suit in the Kyoto District Court .25
Until 1972 Japan recognized the ROC as the government of China
with which it had signed the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952.26 In
1972, while the Kokario case was still pending, Japan and the PRC issued
a Joint Communique in which Japan recognized the PRC as the government of China. 27 That Joint Communique, discussed above, stated in
part that Japan "fully understands and respects" the PRC's position that
"Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of
China."2 8 This statement referred to the Potsdam Proclamation of July
26, 1945,29 in which the Great Powers reiterated the Cairo Declaration
of 1943 that Taiwan, then under Japanese control, was part of mainland
China. Japan's Foreign Minister, Masayoski Ohira, stated at a press conference immediately after the signing of the Joint Communique that Japan had withdrawn its recognition of ROC as the government of
China.3" In response to the Joint Communique, the ROC severed diplomatic relations with Japan, referring to Japan's "perfidious" actions.3 '
21. First Decision, supra note 1, at 9.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 9, 10. It appears that the litigation was necessary to secure the registration.
24. Id. at 3-5.
25. First Decision, supra note 1.
26. Treaty of Peace, supra note 11.
27. Communique, supra note 13, at 81; see also Kuriyama, supra note 13, at 42; Iriye,
supra note 13, at 52; Takano, supra note 13, at 62.
28. Supra text accompanying note 13.
29. Conference of Berlin (Potsdam),supra note 5, at 1474.

30. "Finally, although it is not mentioned in the Joint Communique, it is the view of the
Japanese Government that as a result of the normalization of Japan-China relations, the
Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China has lost the basis for its existence
and is considered to have ceased to be effective." Kuriyama, supra note 13, at 48; Takano,
supra note 13, at 62.
31. Republic of China Severs Ties with Japan, Central Daily News, Sept. 31, 1972, at 1,
col. 1 (right to left).
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Japan then severed its diplomatic relations with the ROC.32 Subsequently, Japan and the PRC signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship3 3
effective October 23, 1978.
In 1977, a decade after the lawsuit began, the Kyoto District Court
[hereinafter District Court] dismissed the action on the ground that as "a
matter of.. . international law [there is] a right to own and control the
property, which is a public property of China, to have passed on from the
Government of the [ROC] to the Government of [PRC] as long as the
Japanese Government has recognized the latter as the only lawful gov34
ernment in China."
B.

The Osaka High Court's Opinion

The Taiwanese authorities appealed in the name of the Republic of
China to the Osaka High Court [hereinafter High Court]. The High
Court, relying on the expert opinions of several Japanese professors of
international law, overruled the lower court's judgment and remanded
the case for judgment on the merits. 35 The High Court held that the
Republic of China is a "de facto government not recognized" or a "government for which recognition had been annulled" which was still governing the Taiwan Islands. 3 6 The High Court considered it significant
that a frequent exchange of people and close trade relations were continuing between Japan and Taiwan.3 7
The High Court minimized the significance of its decision for Japan's recognition of the PRC as the government of China. It held that
recognition is a political act of the executive based on political considera32. Id.
33. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Aug. 12, 1978, China-Japan, 17 I.L.M. 1054.
34. First Decision, supra note 1, at 13.
35. Republic of China v. U Heikan, Case No. 1977 (NE) 1622 (Osaka High Ct., 6th Civ.
Dep't Apr. 14, 1977) (translation on file at Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.) [hereinafter Second Decision]. The translation is entirely satisfactory. See supra note 1. See also First Decision, supra note 1. The Japanese courts attempted to determine the relevant international law
as well as the need under domestic law to resolve disputes over property. For example, the
High Court first relied upon "influential theories" of recognition and locus standi. See Second
Decision, supra, at 12. Hence, the High Court accepted the opinion of Professor Yamamoto,
one of the experts, that
"[i]t
is a principle well-established for the purpose of applying international laws that
if a new government fully and conclusively replaces an former one within any nation
..then any and all public properties and rights owned by the former government
shall be transferred to the new one without any exceptions based upon the fact itself
of succession of political authority."
Id. at 19.
36. Second Decision, supra note 35, at 10, 11, 16.
37. Id. at 15.
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tions.3 8 Distinguishing a court's function from the government's, the
High Court stated that its duty was to resolve private legal disputes and
that it need not base its judgment on the political considerations underlying the Japanese government's recognition of the PRC.3 9
The High Court held that the ROC had locus standi because of its
status as an unrecognized de facto government and the existence of business relations between the Taiwanese and Japanese people.' ° It emphasized that this did not change Taiwan's status in international law or
derogate from the Japanese government's recognition of the PRC as the
sole and legitimate government of China.4 1 The High Court added that
it fully understood and respected the PRC's position that Taiwan is an
integral part of China's territory.4 2
The High Court also ruled that the dormitory belonged to the ROC
based on a rule which it described as "incomplete succession," since, in
its view, the "old" government of China still existed. 43 If the old government had been completely demolished, said one of the experts, the new
44
government would have succeeded to all of its predecessor's property.
However, since in the High Court's view, the old government had not
been completely "demolished," the PRC could not claim any property
beyond its actual control.4 5
In 1982 on remand, the Kyoto District Court entered judgment in
favor of the ROC.4 6 Complying with the High Court's decision, the
District Court distinguished between a government's sovereign property
and its private property.47 The District Court held that diplomatic and
consular property used by the old government to exercise its sovereignty,
became the property of the new government wherever the property was
located.4 8 However, the District Court held that the dormitory was not
within this category because it could be operated by a party other than
38. Id. at 13.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 15.
41. Id. at 14-16.
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id. at 15-16.
44. Id. at 19.
45. Id.
46. Republic of China v. U Heikan (Case for Evacuation of Land and Building), CaseyNo.
1982 (WA) 1382 (Kyoto Dist. Ct., 3d Civ. Dep't Feb. 4, 1986) (translation on file at Hastings
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.) [hereinafter Third Decision]. The translation is not entirely satisfactory. See supra note 1.
47. Id. at 17-19.
48. Id. at 17-18.

1990]

The Kokario Case

the state.4 9 The dormitory occupants appealed to the Osaka High Court
which upheld the District Court's judgment."0 They then appealed to
51
the Supreme Court in Tokyo where the case is now pending.
The reasoning of the Japanese courts in this case is sparse in contrast to the opinion an American or English court would have written in
a similar case. Japan has a civil-law, not a common-law, system and has
no tradition of extensive reasoning in its opinions. 2 However, the courts
in this case had the benefit of elaborate expert opinions which influenced
their reasoning. 53 These expert opinions rely upon English and Ameri54
can scholars, judicial decisions, and executive and legislative actions.
The reason undoubtedly is that most of the writing on the subject, both
scholarly and judicial, has been English or American.'5
Although the PRC was not a party to the litigation, it had a direct
interest as the claimed successor to the government property. 56 It as49. Id. at 17, 19.
50. U Heikan v. Taiwan (Case for Evacuation of Land and Building), Case No. 1986 (NE)
335 (Osaka High Ct., 10th Civ. Dep't Feb. 26, 1987) (translation on file at Hastings Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev.) [hereinafter Fourth Decision]. The translation is not entirely satisfactory. See
supra note 1. See also First Decision, supra note 1; 31 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 201 (1988).

51. Interview from Guang Hua Liao, People's Daily, Aug. 20, 1987, at 6, col. 1 (left to
right).
52. See 0. HENDERSON & J. HALEY, LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 79 (1978).
53. Professor Jinsuke Ando was an expert witness for the ROC in the lower court. Expert
Opinion of Ando, First Decision, supra note 1, (given Feb. 19, 1974) (translation on file at
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.) [hereinafter Ando]. On appeal, Professor Sozi Yamamoto
was an expert witness for the ROC. Expert Opinion of Yamamoto, Second Decision, supra
note 35, (given Dec. 1, 1979) (translation on file at Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.) [hereinafter Yamamoto]. The translations are not entirely satisfactory. See supra note 1.
54. See, eg., Ando, supra note 53, at 3, 6, 13; Yamamoto, supra note 53, at 28, 31, 41.
55. Indeed, as seen in Professor Louis Jaffe's seminal study, it was the Russian cases after
the Soviet Revolution that gave rise to the important litigation in which both the federal courts
and the New York Court of Appeals established the principles of law relied upon by courts
today. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONSpasSim (1933). In contrast, the

mass of litigation involving Cuba and Iran, far in excess of the Russian cases, posed issues of
sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine rather than those of recognition. The United
States government had recognized the governments of Cuba and Iran. The break in diplomatic relations with Cuba did not affect Cuba's right to litigate, although one federal judge
mistakenly thought so and suspended the litigation. Dade Drydock Corp. v. M/T Mar, 199 F.
Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1961). The Supreme Court, correctly distinguishing between nonrecognition and a breach in diplomatic relations, was of a different view in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964). A few recognition cases in recent years have involved
East Germany, Angola, and Vietnam. See, e.g., Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon,
478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973); Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofen, 358 F. Supp. 747
(E.D.N.Y. 1970).
56. The High Court noted "there are indications of the Government [i.e. PRC] never
having invoked such rights" as in common knowledge that the PRC raised the issue with the
Japanese government on many occasions in the past. High CourtErrorsRegardingGuang Lui
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serted publicly that the High Court's decision violated the "one China"
principle and the 1972 Joint Communique.5 7 In addition, the PRC has
been paying for the repair of the building since 1974, in support of the
public education program for Chinese students abroad.5 8
The PRC requested the Japanese government advise the courts of its
views as to the consequences of recognition, specifically that the PRC, as
the recognized successor government of China, owned the dormitory.
The Japanese government refused to do so because the judiciary was an
independent branch of the government and it was improper for the gov59
ernment to present its views in a lawsuit to which it was not a party.
The PRC has continued its diplomatic efforts to persuade the Japanese
government to take a position, but to no avail. As a result, the case is a
cause celebre in Chinese political and legal circles and has caused a
greater tension between the PRC and Japanese governments than has
existed since recognition in 1972.60
IV.

THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF RECOGNITION
AND TITLE

The Japanese courts' opinions consisted of generalizations and contained no cited supporting authorities. It is therefore appropriate to look
at the expert opinions of Professors Jinsuke Ando and Sozi Yamamoto,
which clearly formed the basis for the courts' opinions. Those expert
opinions are elaborate in their analyses of judicial decisions and leading
scholarly works.6 1
The expert opinions address two issues: standing to sue and ownership of property. The opinions first discuss ownership and then standing
to sue, an order which an American or English court would not have
adopted because standing is usually a preliminary issue and could be dispositive of the substantive issues. The following analysis is in reverse
order and will first treat locus standi and then the substantive issues of
the ownership of the property.
A.

Standing to Sue
Judicial precedents, particularly in England and the United States,

Liao - Chinese Embassy Protests Decision, People's Daily, Feb. 27, 1987, at 6, col. I (left to
right) [hereinafter High Court].
57. Id.

58. Press Conference, supra note 18.
59. Id.; People's Daily, Apr. 4, 1987; People's Daily, June 28, 1987.
60. Press Conference, supra note 18; High Court, supra note 56.
61. Ando, supra note 53; Yamamota, supra note 53.
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hold that an unrecognized government is not competent to sue in the
courts of the nonrecognizing or host country. 2 Hersh Lauterpacht and
Ian Brownlie express this majority view of the law.6 3 However, dissenters from this view, writing many years ago, include Osmond K. Fraenkel
and Professors Edwin Borchard and Louis Jaffe." 4
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States also makes locus standi dependent
upon recognition. Section 205(1) states that "an entity not recognized as
a state, or a regime not recognized as the government of a state, is ordinarily denied access to courts in the United States."6 5 The judicial rationale is based on comity, as the New York Court of Appeals stated in
the Cibrariocase.66 Likewise, in 1952 an English court ruled in the Sultan of Johore case that the proper source of information as to a foreign
power, its status and sovereignty, is the sovereign of England.6 7
There are several narrow exceptions to the doctrine. First, cases
such as Wulfsohn 68 upheld the assertion of sovereign immunity by an
unrecognized government. This exception is based upon the right of a
state, regardless of nonrecognition, not to submit to another state's jurisdiction. The court in Wulfsohn stated that the control within the defendant's territories is a fact, not a theory, and that an independent
government, although unrecognized, does not have to answer for its acts
in our courts.69
Another exception or modification of the rule is the Upright or corporate doctrine.7'
Under this doctrine, a corporate entity (or its assignee) established under the laws of an unrecognized government has
62. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
63. See H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 145, 159 (1947); I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (3d ed. 1979); see, e.g., 1 D.P.

O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 183, 186 (1965); M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 226
(2d ed. 1986); Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E.
259 (1923); City of Beme v. Bank of England, [1804] 9 Ves. Jun. 347.
64. The Supreme Court in Sabbatino noted that the doctrine had been criticized and that
it intimated "no view on the possibility of access by an unrecognized government to United
States courts." 376 U.S. 398, 411 n.12 (1964); L. JAFFE, supra note 55, at 232-36; Borchard,
The Unrecognized Government in American Courts, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 261 (1932); Fraenkel,
The Juristic Status of Foreign States, Their Property And TheirActs, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 544
(1925).
65. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 205(1).
66. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259.
67. Sultan of Johore v. Abubakar, 1952 App. Cas. 318, 340-41.
68. Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24
(1923).
69. Id. at 375-76.
70. Upright v. Mercury Business Machines Co., 13 A.D.2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961).
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locus standi.7 1 This was the subject of an article by Professor Stanley
Lubman, 7 upon which one of the experts in the Kokario case relied to
urge the irrelevance of whether a government is recognized. 7 3 However,
Upright concerns a corporate entity's (or its assignee's) standing to sue
and not the standing to sue of the government itself.7 4
Professor Brownlie and other scholars have suggested the possibility
of a different rule in civil-law countries where judicial independence of
the executive is greater.7 5 For example, the lower courts of the Netherlands and Egypt have upheld suits by the Soviet government or its representatives before the Soviet Union was recognized by the forum state.7 6
However, unlike the ROC in this case, there was no doubt that the Soviet
government represented the Russian state.
Japan, with its Germanic code background, may be considered a
civil-law country for this purpose. 7 7 However, Japan may also be influenced by the Anglo-American doctrine, particularly since its Constitution was written under General MacArthur's influence. The Japanese
Constitution, like the United States Constitution, divides authority
among the three branches of the government with a clear allocation of
78
foreign affairs powers to the executive.
The reasoning of the Japanese High Court and of the expert opinions does not support a deviation from the basic rule. The High Court
emphasized the need to resolve private disputes in court, 79 but this case is
not a private dispute because it involves two governments disputing ownership of public property. The Upright doctrine is clearly distinguishable. A Taiwanese corporation should not be precluded from tort or
contract litigation, but in this case the property was never vested in a
corporation. The argument that the ROC controls Taiwan and is a de
facto government might have relevance if the property was located in
Taiwan or if Taiwan had relied upon an act of state within its territorial
71. Id.
72. Lubman, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts: Upright v. Mercury Business Machines, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 275 (1962).
73. Ando, supra note 53, at 32-33.
74. Upright, 13 A.D.2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417.
75. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 101 (referring to "the constitutional position of
the British and American courts in matters concerning foreign relations").
76. See, e.g., Russian Trade Delegation in Turkey v. Levant Red Sea Coal Company and

Others, 7 Ann. Dig. 82 (1933); "Exportchleb" Ltd. v. Goudeket, 8 Ann. Dig. 117 (1935).
77. 0. HENDERSON & J. HALEY, supra note 52, at 79.
78. The Constitution of Japan, signed by the Emperor on November 3, 1946, gives the
Cabinet "executive power" to manage foreign affairs. JAP. CONST. arts. 65, 73, reprintedin 1
EHS LAW BULLETIN SERIES: JAPAN, at AAl, AA12-13.
79. Second Decision, supra note 35, at 12.

1990]

The Kokario Case

jurisdiction."0 However, in the present case, the property is in Japan.
Perhaps the general rule should not apply so that a de facto unrecognized government would have locus standi, if the host country had
adopted the declaratory theory of recognition or dispensed with the formal procedure of recognition."1 Yet, the rule should apply if the de facto
unrecognized government is confronted both with its own derecognition
and the recognition of its rival as the sole government of the state

involved.
The expert opinions found Paragraph 3 of the Joint Communique
ambiguous when it stated "the government of Japan fully understands

and respect[s]" the position of the government of the PRC that Taiwan is
an inalienable part of the territory.8 2 That statement is not ambiguous,
however, when incorporated with the Potsdam Declaration.8 3 It would
be a rare statement of recognition in which the state involved is described

in territorial terms.84

In assessing the ROC's right to sue in Japan, one must ask what
state the ROC represents in the lawsuit. It cannot sue as the government
of Taiwan since Taiwan is not a state and does not claim to be one.8 On
the contrary, the Taiwanese authorities assert that the Island of Taiwan
80. Cf Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (upholding the act of
state doctrine with respect to property located in Cuba which was nationalized by the Cuban
government).
81. See Foreign Governments (Recognition), 485 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 2410-11
(1951). This concept of the declaratory theory of recognition is borrowed from one of the two
doctrines associated with the situation of state recognition, namely the constitutive doctrine
and the declaratory doctrine. The constitutive doctrine maintains that, prior to recognition,
the community in question possesses neither the rights nor the obligations that international
law associates with full statehood. It is the will of recognizing states that creates and attributes
the legal existence of a new state. The declaratory doctrine, however, views a state as an
existing subject of international law. It is a subject of international rights and duties as soon as
it exists as a fact which is as soon as it fulfils the conditions of statehood. Recognition merely
declares the existence of that fact. However, Lauterpacht holds that recognition is both constitutive of the international personality of the new state and declaratory of an existing physical
fact. In the case of government recognition, the recognition of a government arising out of the
abnormal circumstances of a revolutionary change amounts to a declaration that the new authority fulfills the requisite conditions of government capacity. In other words, such recognition consists in the ascertainment of an existing fact. See H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 72, 170 (Cambridge 1948).
82. Ando, supra note 53, at 9-10; see also Yamamoto, supra note 53, at 14, 21-22.
83. See Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), supra note 5, at 1474.
84. That point was recently made by the French Foreign Ministry in another connection.
Markham, Europe Welcomes the P.L.O.'sAction, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1988, at A14, col. 3.
85. "Since the authorities on Taiwan do not claim that Taiwan is a state of which they are
the government, the issue of its statehood has not arisen .... If Taiwan should claim statehood, it would in effect be purporting to secede from China." RESTATEMENT, supra note 3,
§ 201 & reporters' notes 8; see also id. § 203 comment f, reporters' notes 3.
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is part of China and that they represent that country. 6 Therefore, ROC
cannot sue as the government of China in the courts of a country that
derecognized the ROC and recognizes the PRC as the government of
China. The ROC's dilemma is illustrated by its change of name to "Taiwan" on the second appeal from the prior name of "Republic of
China. "87

In The Creation of States, Professor James Crawford demonstrates
that Taiwan is not a state, particularly since it makes no claim to being a
state."8 The only significant scholarly works asserting that Taiwan is a
state are by the Taiwanese scholars at the University of Maryland 9 and
Mr. Zung-Chu Chen and Professor Michael Reisman of Yale Law
School.9"
Taiwan has the traditional attributes of a state such as territory,
population, internal and external political power, and independence. 9'
Nevertheless, the ROC's conception of the state goes beyond Taiwan and
includes all of China. If the state does include all of China, the Japanese
courts must honor the Japanese government's view that the PRC represents China.
Professor Crawford describes Taiwan as a "consolidated, local de
facto government in a civil war situation."9 2 It is such, because of its
physical control of a small part of the state of China.9 3 This would not,
however, give Taiwan standing in a Japanese court to sue as the government of China.
Most of the countries of the world recognize the PRC as the govern86. See J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (6th ed.
1979); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 201 & reporters' notes 8; see also id. § 203 comment f,
reporters' notes 3.
87. See Fourth Decision, supra note 50, at 1.
88. J. CRAWFORD, supra note 86, at 142-52; see also Brownlie, supra note 2, at 202.
89. See, e.g., Chou, InternationalStatus of The Republic of China, 6 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L
L. & AFF. 161 (1986-1987); Ma, Two Major Legal Issues Relating to The InternationalStatus
of the Republic of China, 6 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 171 (1986-1987). See generally 6
CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. (1986-1987).
90. See Chen & Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Searchfor InternationalTitle, 81 YALE
L.J. 599 (1972).
91. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 201. As the Restatement puts it: "While the traditional definition does not formally require it, an entity is not a state if it does not claim to be a
state. For example, Taiwan might satisfy the elements of the definition in this section, but its
authorities have not claimed it to be a state, but rather part of the state of China." Id. comment f.
92. J. CRAWFORD, supra note 86, at 151. Judge G.G. Fitzmaurice has referred to such
insurgent groups as "para-statal entities" possessing a definite if limited form of international
personality. [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.14/SER.A.
93. See Chen & Reisman, supra note 90.
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ment of China; 94 the few exceptions cannot obscure this reality. The
United Nations ouster of Taiwan from the China seat is another aspect of
this reality, although not dispositive since membership in the United Nations is not a condition of statehood. Yet, it cannot be overlooked that
Taiwan did not keep a seat as the representative of either China or Taiwan. 91 Even the Taiwan Relations Act of the United States, which gives
Taiwan many of a state's rights and privileges, is clear that the relationship is between American citizens and Taiwanese citizens and not between the respective governments.9 6
B. The Successor Government's Title to State Property
While the issues of locus standi and title are interrelated, the grant of
standing to the ROC would not alone establish its title to the disputed
property. Even if a liberal locus standi rule permitted unrecognized governments to litigate, it may not extend to an unrecognized government's
claim to state property that is also claimed by its recognized successor.
However, assuming that the High Court was correct and Taiwan had
standing to sue, the critical substantive issue of entitlement to the dormitory remains.
The law related to title seems clearer than the law of locus standi:
the recognized successor government is entitled to the predecessor government's property. The major international law scholars are in agreement on this proposition. As Professor Lassa Oppenheim writes, a
recognized government "becomes entitled to demand and receive possession of property situate within a jurisdiction of a recognizing State, which
formerly belonged to the preceding Government at the time of its supersession." 97 This principle is accepted by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Professor Daniel Patrick O'Connell, Mr. Joseph Gabriel Starke, and more
recently Professor Malcolm Shaw. 9s It is repeated in the American Law
Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States. Section 205 (2) states that under the law of the United
States: "[A] regime not recognized as the government of a state is not
entitled to property belonging to that state located in the United
94. Information received from the Chinese Permanent Mission to the United Nations.
95. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
96. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 (1979).
97. L. OPPENHEIM, 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed.

1955).
98. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 63, at 143; 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 63, at 207;
M. SHAW, supra note 63, at 229; J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW

145 (6th ed. 1967).
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States." 99
The issue frequently arises in litigation between governments in the
courts of a third state. This occurred during the Abyssinian War, the
Spanish Civil War, and the banking dispute between Beijing and Taiwan."°° In Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company,10 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the award of bank deposits located in the United States to the
ROC, because at the time the United States recognized the ROC as the
government of China. The reason that the successor government recognized by the third state is entitled to its predecessor's property is that the
property belongs to the state rather than to a specific government."0 A
change in the government is merely an internal change of control that
does not affect its personality. 103
The Japanese courts could not and did not challenge this rule and its
underlying rationale. The District Court stated: "[A] right to own and
control the Property, which is a public property of China.. ." passed to
the PRC "as long as the Japanese Government has recognized ...[the
PRC] as the only lawful government in China"."
The High Court agreed with Professor Yamamoto that "if a new
government fully and conclusively replaces a former one ... then any
and all public properties . . .shall be transferred to the new [government]."' ' The qualifications "fully and conclusively" should not affect
the PRC's title since the Joint Communique did not qualify or modify
Japan's recognition of the PRC as the government of China and its derecognition of the ROC.
Nevertheless, the High Court asserted a different rule in cases of
"incomplete succession." The High Court, relying upon the experts'
views, stated:
[I]n case of incomplete succession, such as when the former government survives such replacement maintaining its effective ruling over a
99. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 204 comment a, reporters' notes 1.
100. See, e.g., Haile Selassie v. Cable & Wireless, [1939] 2 Ch. 182 (C.A.); see Haile Selassie
v. Cable & Wireless, [1938] Ch. 545; Haile Selassie v. Cable & Wireless, [1938] Ch. 839 (C.A.);
Spanish Government v. Felipe Campuzano, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 609 (1939).
101. 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953).
102. See Chang v. Registrar of Title, 8 Aust. L. Rep. 285, 287, 292 (1976) (reference to
"the vendor, the sovereign state of China" in a case in which the court did not decide "[the]
effect, if any, the changes in political recognition had on the availability of these memoranda of

transfer.").
103. See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 86, at 405.
104. First Decision, supra note 1,at 13.
105. Second Decision, supra note 35, at 19.
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limited geographic area as a de facto government, or when ruling by
the new government does not cover the whole country, in such case it
is not uniform how to treat any such public property of the country
located in any foreign country as owned in the name of the former
government;
it depends on [the] judgment of competent domestic
10 6
courts.

1. State Succession
There is no authority or rationale for the High Court's finding of
partial succession in this situation. The High Court, as did its experts,
appears to have confused the rules of governmental succession with those
of state succession. Partial state succession, as distinguished from government succession, is addressed by Professor O'Connell, the principal
scholarly authority on the subject.1" 7 Similarly, the International Law
Commission's studies of partial succession upon which Professor Ando
relied discussed state, not government, succession. 10 8
State succession can be partial when two or more states emerge from
a single state as a result of revolution, conquest, or otherwise. This requires that the courts of a third state in which disputed property is located must determine which of the two disputing states is entitled to that
property. In that case, it is not unreasonable that the predecessor state
should retain title to certain of its property.
However, rules of state succession are not applicable to government
succession. In government succession, the original state is unchanged,
even if some of its territory is occupied and controlled by another
power.109 For example, in Cyprus, despite the Turkish government's occupation of Northern Cyprus and its creation of a rival government in
that area, only one government is universally recognized as the government of Cyprus.1 10
Even if the concept of partial succession of governments existed, the
PRC still has the right to the property of the Chinese state. Since a
106. Id.
107. D.P. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION (1956); 1 & 2 D.P. O'CONNELL,
STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967); [hereinafter
D.P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION]; see also J.G STARKE, supra note 98, at 277-78 (recog-

nizing the different rules for the succession of states and governments).
108. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Thirty-Third
Session, [1981] [2 pt. 2] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 9, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.1
(Part 2) [hereinafter Thirty-Third Session].
109. See J. CRAWFORD, supra note 86, at 404.
110. See, e.g., Resolution 367 of the United Nations Security Council, 30 U.N. SCOR at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/367 (1975); J. CRAWFORD, supra note 86, at 118; cf Hesperides Hotels v.
Aegean Holidays, [1978] 1 Q.B. 205 (C.A.) (Lord Denning).
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change of government does not change the personality of the state, the
new government is merely that state's new governmental agency resulting from an internal change of control.
2.

Retroactivity of Japan's Recognition of the PRC

The expert opinions inquired whether the Japanese government's
recognition of the PRC was retroactive to the purchase date of the property.'
But the existence of the PRC's title does not depend upon the
retroactivity of measures taken by the predecessor or the successor governments. For example, the legality of the ROC's purchase of the dormitory when it was recognized by Japan is not questioned. The legality of
the purchase was not undermined by the Chinese revolution. The critical
fact here is the Japanese recognition of the PRC which transferred title of
China's property to the PRC.
Both experts also relied upon the House of Lords decision upholding the (London) Refugee Government's agreement to pay severance
monies to Polish seamen. The agreement was made shortly before British recognition of the Lublin government." 2 The agreement was valid
despite the de facto status of the Lublin government at the time of the
agreement and retroactivity in favor of the Lublin government would not
apply. The House of Lords correctly interpreted the intention of the
British government when it recognized the Lublin government. This appears from Martin Gilbert's vivid description of Churchill's position on
the issue at Potsdam."' Since the Kokario case does not involve the va111. The expert opinions also addressed issues which seem to have influenced the High
Court, with doubtful relevance. For example, Professor Yamamoto set forth at great length
the conflicting views of three international law professors as to when Taiwan was returned to
China. These scholars suggested alternative theories: Taiwan's seizure by Japan in 1895 was
illegal; Taiwan was returned when the Japanese accepted the Potsdam Declaration when they
surrendered to the Allies; or Taiwan was returned when the Peace Treaties after the Second
World War were signed. Ando, supra note 53, at 9.
It seems immaterial in this case how and when Taiwan was restored to China. The issue
here is not Taiwan's territorial control, but which government represents the Chinese state in
seeking, in the courts of Japan, the return of that state's property.
Some of Professor Ando's arguments and citations relate only superficially to the issues in
Kokario. For example, in Luigi Monta of Genoa v. Cechofracht Co., the House of Lords held
that a maritime charter provision authorizing obedience to a "government" order justified the
unloading of cargo as ordered by the military authority of Taiwan in 1955, even though Britian
recognized the PRC. Application of the language in a charter provision to a ship within Taiwan territory has no bearing upon title to property in Japan. [1956] 2 Q.B. 552, [1956] 2 All E.
R. 769. Similarly, Lord Denning held that Taiwan was a "country" within the meaning of an
athletic federation's rule. Reel v. Holder, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1226 (C.A.).
112. Gdynia-Ameryka Linie Zeglugowe Spolka Akoyina v. Boguslawski and Another, 16
Ann. Dig. 46, 46-48 (1950).

113. 8 M.

GILBERT, WINSTON CHURCHILL, NEVER DESPAIR

1945-65, at 60-104 (1988).
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lidity of the predecessor government's original action, the issue of retroactivity is irrelevant. The British case does not suggest that recognition
of the validity of the predecessor government's acts should deny the successor government's title to state property. The House of Lords did not
challenge the authority of the Lublin government over the Polish shipping company after British recognition.
Professor Ando addresses judicial decisions giving "certain kinds of
legal effects . . . [to conduct] of nonrecognized de facto regimes."" 4
These include cases recognizing the validity of Soviet laws before the Soviet Union was formally recognized. 1 5 However, he notes that these
cases might not be consistent with the case of "former governments after
recognition being replaced by the new erected one."' 1 6 The laws of de
facto governments operating within their territories, have generally been
given weight, particularly when they deal with such matters as divorce
affecting the lives of the inhabitants of those areas. That is much different from an attempt to apply those laws outside the territory governed by
the de facto government.
Professor Ando would also adopt the calibration method to determine when property vests in the successor government. He argues that
since the PRC did not regard itself as bound by the ROC treaties it was
not entitled to property purchased by the ROC after 1949.11 However,
the succession to treaty rights and obligations does not determine the
succession to property rights." 8 The studies of treaties after succession
have never included studies of property after succession. 1 9
3. Significance of the Character of the Property
The International Law Commission's Report on the succession of
The Polish Government, Churchill explained, had been financed during its five and a
half years in the United Kingdom by the British Government: '[W]e had paid the
Poles about 120,000,000 [pounds] to finance their Army and diplomatic service, and
to enable them to look after Poles who had sought refuge on our shores from the
German scourge.' When Britain had disavowed the Polish Government in London
and recognized the new Provisional Polish Government in Warsaw, it had been arranged that three months' salary should be paid to all employees and that they
should then be dismissed. It would have been 'improper', Churchill noted, to have
dismissed them without this payment, and the expense had fallen upon Great Britain.
Id. at 72.
114. Ando, supra note 53, at 13.
115. See, eg., Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 33 F.2d 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1929).
116. Ando, supra note 53, at 16.
117. Id. at 26.
118. J.G. STARKE, supra note 98, at 281, 287.
119. Thirty-ThirdSession, supra note 108, pt. 2, at 10.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 13

states gives an alternative definition of public property; all property,
rights, and interests belonging to the state.1 20 The reference to "property
appertaining to sovereignty"''2 in the ILC's early draft, may have been
the source of the distinction made by the High Court in this case. Professor Ando, citing Professor O'Connell,12 stated that while Anglo-American law makes no distinction between different uses of public property,
continental law does so in the areas of state succession.123 This raises
several questions: (1) are the rules of state and government succession
identical in this context; (2) are there different rules for different types of
property for government succession; and (3) assuming there are such different rules, should Japan be guided by the claimed rules of the continental system? For the reasons set forth below, the answer to all three
questions is "no."
The High Court held that "if requested to do so by the government
of People's Republic of China," 124 the latter would be entitled to those
properties in Japan "owned in the name of appellant [ROC] only to the
extent that such properties should be directly related in [its] use and/or
[its] nature to any national functions of representing the country now
that the Government was recognized by the Japanese Government as the
only lawful government in China." 125 On remand, the Kyoto District
Court clarified the ruling by confining such property, for example, to
26
diplomatic and consular premises.'

Professor Ando's citation of authority is not persuasive. He stated
that upon France's recognition of the PRC, the ROC's embassy was
given to the PRC,1 7 without indicating whether other properties were
the subject either of claims or litigation. He noted that in 1938 the
Supreme Court of Norway directed the return of furniture and diplomatic documents to the Spanish Republic government. These items were
taken by Franco's representatives from the Spanish Delegations in
120. Succession of States: (b) Succession in Respect of Matters Other Than Treaties, [1970]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 131, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add.1 [hereinafter Succession of States].
121. Id. at 143.
122.

1 D.P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 107, at 200.

123. Ando, supra note 53, at 24, 25.
124. The People's Republic's position on not participating in foreign litigation is a consistent one. The U.S. State Department assumed, incorrectly, I believe, the PRC's need to appear
in the Chinese Railway Bond case. The PRC did so without argument which it left to the
United States as amicus curiae.
125. Second Decision, supra note 35, at 21.
126. Third Decision, supra note 46, at 17.
127. Ando, supra note 53, at 23.
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Oslo.'
The Norwegian court's reference to "property... used as an
instrument of the exercise of governmental power" could hardly establish
a legal limitation since no other property was involved.129
The Japanese courts did not view the dormitory as possessing a sovereign character 130 because, it argued, private parties other than the state
could own a dormitory.13 ' This is an inappropriate test for determining
what is not public property. 132 Assuming that the dormitory was not
related "to any national functions of representing the country," the distinction between that type of public property and any other is doubtful in
the context of governmental property ownership. The property does not
belong to a particular government. Rather, it belongs to the state of
China and it does not matter whether it is aircraft, a bank account, or a
dormitory. Since the Chinese state is now represented by the PRC, the
PRC is entitled to control over the property as the agent of that state.
Again, the concept of different kinds of state property, relied upon
by Professor Ando, 1 3 3 is found in the discussions by the International
Law Commission on the succession of states, not on the succession of
governments. 34 Even then, the International Law Commission regarded
the division of state property into public and
private domains as "unsatis136
factory"' 135 and found it would "die out.'
4. The Dormitory as Sovereign Property
First, Professor O'Connell's statement is related to state succession
only, and is inappropriately cited by Professor Ando for the present case
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Campuzano v. Spanish Government, 11 Ann. Dig. 68 (1938).
Id. at 72.
Second Decision, supra note 35, at 21.
Third Decision, supra note 46, at 19.
Oddly, dormitories for state employees are defined as public state property under the

Japanese State Property Act. COLLECTION OF JAPANESE CODES State Property Act art. 3, at

182 (H. Suekawa ed. 1962).
133. Ando, supra note 53, at 24-25.
134. Thirty-Third Session, supra note 108, at 9.
135. Succession of States, supra note 120, at 143.
136. Id. at 134. Ultimately, it accepted the domestic law of the predecessor state as the

criterion, but again it was treating state succession. Vienna Convention on Succession of States
in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, art. 8, U.N. GAOR at 6, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.117/14 (1983) [hereinafter Vienna Convention], reprintedin 22 I.L.M. 306, 310; Thirty-

Third Session, supra note 108, at 17, 45. Professor O'Connell, in discussing the distinction
between the public domain and private domain, refers to different views as to what passes to

the successor state in cases of succession, but his discussion is also within the framework of
state succession. 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 107, at 199. Even there,
the subsequent Vienna Convention defines the predecessor state's property broadly as "property, rights and interests ... owned by that State."
reprintedin 22 I.L.M. 306, 310.

Vienna Convention, supra, art. 8, at 6,
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of government succession. Regarding government succession, Professor
O'Connell makes it very clear that
The effect of recognition of the new government as the government de
jure is to allow in the courts of the recognizing state that it has succeeded to the public property of its predecessor, including choses in
action. The former government is regarded as divested of its property
both intra- and extra-territorially located, and deprived of its status
as
137
a sovereign claimant in the court of the recognizing country.
If two rules of governmental succession existed, one for property pertaining to sovereignty and another for other property, the Japanese courts
reached the wrong conclusion with respect to the nature of the
dormitory.
The Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, in
his proposed draft, defines "property appertaining to sovereignty" as
such property used by the state "to manifest and exercise its sovereignty
or to perform the general obligations involved in the exercise of its sovereignty (e.g., national defense, security, the promotion of public health
and education, and national development)." 138 To more precisely determine what constitutes this type of property, the Special Rapporteur
states:
It will include first of all public property - in other words, property
which is defined according to three criteria: the public character
which it possesses by reason of its being governed by public law; the

fact that it is not owned by a private person and therefore belongs to
the State; and the fact it is for the use, or at the service, of all the
population. In addition, 139
it includes property which... helps to fulfil
[sic] the general interest.

The dormitory may well fit this definition. The dormitory was
purchased by the Chinese government through the ROC delegation and
was registered in the name of the ROC. The circumstances of this
purchase were not characteristic of a commercial transaction: the source
of the funds, the policy of returning loot, the student initiative, the involvement of a diplomatic mission, and the protection of the students. If
the dispute were over the loot, no one would question its character as
sovereign property. Since the loot belonged to the Chinese state, it is to
that state that it and its proceeds should have been, and were in fact,
returned. The ROC's delegation was engaged in the traditional postwar
137. 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 63, at 207.
138. Succession of States, supra note 120, at 144.

139. Id.
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sovereign function of seeking reparations and the return of loot taken
from mainland China, not in a business enterprise. The return of plundered property or its proceeds is antithetical to the concept of a commercial enterprise.
The High Court expressed some doubt as to the evidence of the
source of the funds used to purchase the dormitory. 14" If such doubt
exists, it should be resolved by a remand to the district court for further
findings on the subject.
V.

THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN
LITIGATION

The Japanese government's unwillingness to advise its courts of its
views seems unreasonable in light of the important international law issues posed by the case. The English and United States courts welcome
and pay deference to their governments' recognition policy.14 1 One
might argue that such a statement is unnecessary since there is no issue
of recognition. However, even in that situation, the House of Lords
sought the English government's views in the Bogusawski case.142
The Japanese government might believe that it should never state its
views in litigation in which it is not a party. However, it did so recently
in a case pending in the United States Supreme Court, Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation.1 43 The Japanese
government, through its United States counsel, urged the Supreme Court
to consider its brief "in the interest of strengthening bilateral relations
between Japan and the United States."'" Although the issues were different from the present case, the Japanese government showed that it was
capable of expressing a view even if it was not a party to the litigation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The judicial opinions in the Kokario case are written in conclusory
terms with little reference to judicial or scholarly authorities. This Article challenges the legal assumptions in the opinions. The expert opinions
underlying the judicial opinions are quite discursive and, to the AngloAmerican reader, somewhat confused. This may be due to the unfamil140. Fourth Decision, supra note 50, at 24.
141. See I D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 63, at 182; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 3,

§ 204 & reporters' notes.
142. Gdynia-Ameryka Linie Zeglugowe Spolka Akoyina v. Boguslawski and Another, 116
Ann. Dig. 46, 46-48 (1950).
143. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
144. Id. at 574.
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iar style of Japanese writings or to the inadequacy of the translations. It
is apparent that the discussions of the cases in the expert opinions were
not sufficiently focused upon the issues in this case and are less than
satisfactory.
This case uniquely presents an amalgam of issues related to government succession, recognition, and derecognition. These issues are
clouded by the High Court's reference to the ROC's physical control
over a part of the Chinese state. This fact should be irrelevant when
considering a successor government's entitlement to the property of the
predecessor government located in another state which has recognized
the successor government and derecognized the predecessor government.
While the High Court may have acted reasonably in granting standing
under the more liberal view of that doctrine, the ROC should not have
prevailed on the merits.

